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INCREASING CASE TRAFFIC:
EXPANDING THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT’S FOCUS ON 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES
Nadia Alhadi*
I.  Introduction
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the 
“ICC” or “the Court”) includes human trafficking
1
—both labor and sex traf-
ficking—as an actus reus constituting a crime against humanity.2 A wide-
spread, pervasive crime afflicting millions around the globe,
3
trafficking 
generally consists of “[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons” through force or coercion “for the purpose of exploi-
tation.”
4
Trafficking is neither confined to a specific geographic area, nor to 
* J.D., December 2018, University of Michigan Law School; Judicial Fellow, Inter-
national Court of Justice. All views and mistakes are my own. I owe a huge thank you to the 
editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law, especially to Chris Opila and Annema-
rie Smith-Morris, for their thoughtful suggestions which helped me work through some seri-
ous knots in earlier versions of this note. Thank you to Professor Sonja Starr and her Interna-
tional Criminal Law seminar, which first gave me the opportunity to really think through this 
topic and provided initial feedback. I am also grateful to the University of Michigan Human 
Trafficking Clinic—where my interest in studying human trafficking began—and especially 
to Professor Elizabeth Campbell, a wonderful instructor, mentor, friend, and a tremendous 
resource for helping me reflect on prosecutable cases. Thank you to Sam for reading multiple 
iterations of this piece, endlessly supporting my endeavors, and keeping me laughing all along 
the way. And most of all, thank you to my parents, Taufiek and Theresa, who are real life su-
perhumans, and to my brother, John. They made sure I made it to and through law school, and 
they have always encouraged me to go where my dreams take me, no matter how many miles 
or oceans away that may be.
1. Hereinafter the general term “trafficking” refers to human trafficking. 
2. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of how article 7’s provisions on slavery capture 
human trafficking.
3. Human Trafficking by the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 7, 2017), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-trafficking-numbers; Global Estimates of 
Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage, INTERNATIONAL LABOR 
ORGANIZATION, at 9 (2017), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf [hereinafter Global Estimates of Modern 
Slavery].
4. G.A. Res. 55/25, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime art. 3(a), Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Trafficking Proto-
col] (providing a widely-accepted definition for human trafficking). See infra Part III (review-
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a particular social, political, or cultural climate. Nor does it only take one 
form: It can fester within one country’s borders, or transcend state bounda-
ries; it can crop up as a side effect of conflict, or occur during moments of 
peace;
5
and it can be perpetrated through complex statewide or cross-border 
networks or confined to micro-level interactions between an individual traf-
ficker and a single victim.
6
Given the internationality of many trafficking schemes, one might ex-
pect that trafficking cases would tend to come before the ICC. The Court, 
however, has never heard a trafficking case.
7
Neither has any other interna-
tional criminal tribunal (“ICT”),
8
though some have heard related cases, 
such as those relating to forced labor in camps
9
and to forced prostitution.
10
ing the aims of the Trafficking Protocol and the obligations it places on States Parties). The 
full text of the article 3(a) reads:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person hav-
ing control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms 
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs[.]
5. See infra Part II (providing an overview on the forms and causes of human traffick-
ing).
6. Id.
7. Idil Atak & James C. Simeon, Human Trafficking: Mapping the Legal Boundaries 
of International Refugee Law and Criminal Justice, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1019, 1036
(2014); see also Cóman Kenny & Nikita Malik, Trafficking Terror and Sexual Violence: Ac-
countability for Human Trafficking and Sexual Gender-Based Violence by Terrorist Groups 
Under the Rome Statute, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 55 (2019). Notably, in a 2018 annu-
al report to the United Nations Security Council, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda expressed 
that her office has begun focusing more on human trafficking, with a particular interest in in-
vestigating trafficking crimes in Libya. Office of the Prosecutor, Statement to the UN Security 
Council on the Situation in Libya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶ 38 (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180509-otp-stat-UNSC-lib. That being said, 
the Court has yet to have any trials for trafficking crimes.
8. Kenny & Malik, supra note 7, at 55. Examples of other tribunals include the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary Chambers for the 
Courts of Cambodia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the International Military Tribunal 
for Germany (the “Nuremburg Tribunal”) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (responsible for the “Tokyo Trials”).
9. See, e.g., Slave Labor—Count Three, United States v. Krupp Von Bohlen und Hal-
bach et al., Military Tribunal III, 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg 
[Nuremburg] Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, ch. VIII, ¶¶ 46–63 
(1950), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IX.pdf (discuss-
ing Krupp’s role in forcing over 100,000 people into labor); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. 
IT-97-25, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 189–207 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 
15, 2002) (reviewing the trial court’s acquittal of the accused for enslavement and slavery of 
forced laborers and reversing the trial court’s acquittal of the accused for persecution in the 
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That being said, the ICC, in conjunction with other international prevention 
mechanisms,
11
has the potential to provide a macro-level response to this 
crime, especially to trafficking schemes entangled with states or state-like 
powers.
This note tackles two main questions. First, has either the unusual way 
trafficking is codified in the Rome Statute or ICT case law prevented the 
Court from prosecuting trafficking as a crime against humanity? Second, if 
the ICC were to develop an interest in introducing the first trafficking cases 
in international criminal law (“ICL”), what should such cases look like? 
Should they be confined only to cases of trafficking in armed conflict, or 
might they also cover certain kinds of systemic trafficking occurring in 
times of relative peace?
The current scholarship falls short in addressing these questions.
12
In an 
effort to fill this gap, this note examines whether and how the ICC could 
form of forced labor for the same behavior); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-2004-16-A, 
Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶ 66 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Feb. 18, 
2005) (indicting the accused for forced labor as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. 
Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/14, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 23 (Mar. 23, 2016), ¶ 
157 (same, for forced labor as enslavement, a crime against humanity).
10. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, Appeal Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (charging the accused with enslavement 
as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on the Con-
firmation of the Charges, ¶¶ 53–57, 74 (June 9, 2014), (confirming that there are grounds to 
prosecute the accused for sexual slavery as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Brima et 
al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, at 14 (indicting the accused of sexual slavery 
and forced marriage as crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Oct. 14, 2008), at 211 (same, for sexual slavery as a 
crime against humanity); see also Kenny & Malik, supra note 7, at 55–56. As Kenny and Ma-
lik explain, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kunarac referenced trafficking in dis-
cussing the definition of enslavement. The ICTY Prosecutor, however, never formally charged 
the three persons accused in that case of trafficking. Id.
11. See, e.g. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4; Convention of the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; G.A. Res. 44/25, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); G.A. Res. 45/158, International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(1990); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); 
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966); Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, May 
16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 197 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2008), https://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/197 [Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings]; SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution pmbl., Jan. 5, 2002, http://saarc-
sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-convention-on-preventing-and-combating-
trafficking-in-women-and-children-for-prostitution.
12. See generally Kenny & Malik, supra note 7 (arguing for the need to judicially ad-
dress the link between human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, and terrorism); 
Harmen van der Wilt, Trafficking in Human Beings, Enslavement, Crimes against Humanity: 
Unravelling the Concepts, 13 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 297 (2014) (arguing that jurisdiction over 
the crime of enslavement belongs to the ICTs while other forms of trafficking are better left to 
national courts); Loring Jones et al, Globalization and Human Trafficking, 34 J. SOC. & SOC.
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begin to introduce, investigate, and prosecute trafficking cases—particularly 
in peacetime situations,
13
where most instances of trafficking occur.
14
Focus-
ing on three archetypal peacetime trafficking situations to which the Office 
of the Prosecutor (the “OTP”) could direct resources, it finds that there is 
space for the ICC to play a greater role in the international effort to combat 
this crime. And endowed with this ability, it should do more.
To date, ICTs have examined crimes against humanity only in the con-
text of conflicts.
15
At the ICC, this may be due to the OTP’s budgetary con-
straints.
16
As investigations of international crimes involve a gargantuan 
analysis of hundreds, even thousands of pieces of evidence and witnesses, 
WELFARE 107 (2007) (analyzing how the dynamics of globalization fueled the growth of hu-
man trafficking); ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
216 (2010) (giving an overview of the various frameworks that exist in international law to 
address human trafficking).
13. The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary provides that “[p]eace as a matter of 
international law is a condition of stability between states among whom there is no armed
conflict or threat of imminent armed conflict.” Peace, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW 
DICTIONARY (2011). Trafficking that occurs in peacetime, i.e., in an atmosphere free of either 
cross-border or internal conflict, will be referred to as “peacetime trafficking” throughout.
14. Myths, Facts, and Statistics (2018), POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/
myths-facts-and-statistics (last visited Apr. 20, 2020); United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime [UNODC], Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, at 11 (2018),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_
web_small.pdf [hereinafter Global Report on Trafficking in Persons].
15. Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond 
Crisis Situations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2007). For an explanation of international 
criminal law’s conflict focus, see generally id., at 1260–70 (explaining that international crim-
inal tribunals tend to rely on Nuremburg jurisprudence and international humanitarian law 
when interpreting the elements of crimes against humanity and that scholarship frequently 
labels international criminal tribunals as “war crimes tribunals”).
16. For an overview of the ICC’s budget, see generally International Criminal Court 
Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2019 of the International Crimi-
nal Court, ICC-ASP/17/10 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
ASP17/ICC-ASP-17-10-ENG.pdf. Pages 8 to 12 provide a concise list of the budget priorities 
of the Court as well as its main cost drivers. See also Situation in the Islamic Republic of Af-
ghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisa-
tion of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 95 (Apr. 
12, 2019) [hereinafter Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] (declining to open an 
investigation into crimes committed in Afghanistan due to the significant amount of resources 
the case would require and the limited financial and human resources of the OTP); Lilian 
Ochieng & Simon Jennings, International Criminal Court Secures Budget Increase, DAILY 
NATION (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.nation.co.ke/news/International-Criminal-Court-
Budget-Increase/-/1056/2150244/-/e7oca3/-/index.html (“Five of [the OTP’s] cases––three of 
them in Kenya––have failed to come to trial because of lack of evidence. [. . . The OTP’s]
ability to launch successful prosecutions [. . .] has been hampered by a range of factors, but 
most boil down to lack of money.”); Jonathan O’Donohue, The International Criminal Court 
at Risk, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 6, 2015, 8:24 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2015/05/06/international-criminal-court-risk (“The prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has stated 
that she has been obliged to scale down resources for investigations into ongoing crimes in 
Libya, in order to be trial ready in other cases beyond Libya.”).
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the OTP’s limited budget forces it to be selective in its prosecutions. It may 
be that the OTP more readily investigates situations involving war or inter-
nal conflict because they emerge as the most egregious ICL violations.
Perhaps as well conflict is more visible, making the elements of these 
crimes easier to prove. It may be that the OTP has considered charging an 
individual with trafficking, but ultimately dropped the accusation because of 
a concern that the Pre-Trial Chamber would not confirm it for insufficient 
evidence.
17
This is especially important in situations where the state or states 
in which the crime is to be investigated threaten non-cooperation.
18
For the purposes of this note, however, the systemic constraints on the 
Court’s ability to consider peacetime trafficking cases will not be consid-
ered at length; rather, this piece aims to plant the seeds for prosecuting labor 
and sex trafficking by envisioning and illustrating the types of peacetime 
cases that would satisfy the elements of article 7.
As will be shown, the Rome Statute does not contain legal barriers to 
prosecuting peacetime trafficking,
19
and the ICC can and should do more to 
combat this crime within its existing framework. Part II begins by discuss-
ing the pervasive nature of the crime and some of its root causes, introduc-
ing why international responses are necessary to address trafficking. Part III 
considers the added value that ICC action would bring to trafficking ac-
countability through the lens of the accomplishments and limitations of the 
Trafficking Protocol and its complementary international anti-trafficking 
regime. Part IV evaluates the Rome Statute’s codification of trafficking as 
an actus reus for crimes against humanity, arguing that the text of article 7 
supports the prosecution of trafficking cases in general and presents no faci-
al barriers to bringing peacetime trafficking cases before the Court. Finally, 
Part V analyzes three archetypal peacetime trafficking situations that are so 
systemic that they satisfy article 7 and could be charged as cases of traffick-
ing at the Court.
17. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
Before an individual’s trial is held, the Pre-Trial Chamber conducts a hearing to confirm the 
charges. Pursuant to article 61(7) of the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber must determine 
“whether there exists sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the 
person committed each of the crimes charged” by the OTP. “The purpose of the pre-trial pro-
ceedings, and specifically of the confirmation hearing, is to determine whether the case as pre-
sented by the Prosecutor is sufficiently established to warrant a full trial.” See also Prosecutor 
v. Ongwen, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 9, ¶14.
18. See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Is-
lamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 44.
19. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7.
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II. A Crime of Far-Reaching Consequences Requiring a 
Global Response
Trafficking is a crime worthy of global attention—including attention at 
the ICC—for at least three reasons. First, trafficking is a pervasive and ever-
growing crime. There are an estimated 24.9 million individuals being traf-
ficked worldwide, including victims of both sex and labor trafficking.
20
Be-
tween 2007 and 2016, the number of trafficking victims in the world in-
creased by approximately 38%.
21
Even these numbers, shocking as they are, 
are only conservative estimates, as challenges innate to measuring an often 
invisible population (e.g., traffickers forcing victims to stay silent, or vic-
tims electing to remain silent about their experiences for fear of the stigma 
they may face from their families or communities) lead to inconsistent or 
non-reporting of incidents.
22
Second, trafficking produces a host of grave consequences that contra-
vene many nearly universally-recognized human rights designed to protect 
one’s person that states have pledged to protect,
23
including individuals’ 
20. Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 9–10.
21. Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 14, at 22. Compare ILO 2012 
Global Estimate of Forced Labour Executive Summary, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION (June 2012), https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/
WCMS_181953/lang—en/index.htm (placing the number of global trafficking victims in 
2012 at 20.9 million), with Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 9) (placing 
the number of global trafficking victims at 24.9 million in 2016).
22. See Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 14, at 15.
23. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is not a treaty, and there-
fore the document itself does not have binding effect on the conduct of states. Despite this, 
some experts consider the document to reflect customary international law on human rights. 
See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namib-
ia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 
Rep. 16, 76 (June 21) (separate opinion by Ammoun, Vice-President) (“Although the affirma-
tions of the Declaration are not binding qua international convention . . . they can bind States 
on the basis of custom . . . whether because they constituted a codification of customary 
law . . . or because they have acquired the force of custom through a general practice accepted 
as law[.]”); South West Africa Cases (Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, at 
250, 293 (July 18) (dissenting opinion by Tanaka, J.); Digital Record of the UDHR, U.N.
HUM. RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Feb. 2009), https://www.ohchr.org/
EN/NEWSEVENTS/Pages/DigitalrecordoftheUDHR.aspx (“The Universal Declaration was 
not merely congruent with some customs and foreign to other cultures. It drew its principles 
from many diverse traditions, and it made them more robust through a uniform codifica-
tion.”). In any case, the UDHR later became the foundation for the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), both of which contain binding obligations on State Parties. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Both treaties have nearly universal participation: The ICCPR has 74 
signatories and 173 parties. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status: ICCPR, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=
4&clang=_en (last visited May 30, 2020). And the ICESCR has 71 signatories and 170 par-
ties. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status: ICCPR, https://treaties.un.org/
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rights to security of person,
24
freedom from servitude
25
and degrading treat-
ment,
26
and a standard of living that ensures health and well-being.
27
It di-
rectly affects security of person because its victims, who are often members 
of vulnerable populations, are prone to becoming targets of physical, psy-
chological, and emotional violence.
28
Traffickers often use coercive tactics 
to initiate relationships with their victims and force them to remain in servi-
tude after they have expressed a desire to escape.
29
Victims can also be sub-
jected to egregious, degrading living situations, ranging from poorly kept 
and even dangerous homes to obliterated privacy, with traffickers monitor-
ing their victims’ every move.
30
Often, victims are harmed by excessive or 
dangerous work conditions.
31
Victims of sex trafficking are prone to serious 
health risks, including HIV/AIDS
32
and severe mental health issues like anx-
iety, insecurity, fear, trauma, and PTSD.
33
They rarely, if ever, have free ac-
cess to basic necessities, like food, sleep, hygiene, and medical care,
34
and 
their families and communities may socially ostracize them, which prevents 
them from engaging with society or seeking help.
35
Third, trafficking also contravenes economic and social rights enshrined 
in international legal instruments. Both the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights emphasize, for example, every individual’s right to free choice of 
employment
36
and just remuneration.
37
Upon a cursory glance of the situa-
tion, it may seem that victims of trafficking receive exactly the compensa-
tion the market demands for their work. But the reality is, that unskilled la-
borers, who are already limited in what jobs they can perform, cannot afford 
to be selective about their work conditions when workers willing to perform 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4 (last visited May 30, 
2020). 
24. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3 (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 9.
25. UDHR, supra note 24, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 8. 
26. UDHR, supra note 24, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7.
27. UDHR, supra note 24, art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 7.
28. Impact of Human Trafficking on Victims and Survivors, HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
SEARCH, http://humantraffickingsearch.org/impact/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
29. Id.
30. Taking a Lesson From Traffickers: Harnessing Technology To Further the Anti-
Trafficking Movement’s Principal Goals, U.S. MISSION TO THE OSCE (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://osce.usmission.gov/taking-a-lesson-from-traffickers-harnessing-technology-to-further-
the-anti-trafficking-movement. 
31. Impact of Human Trafficking on Victims and Survivors, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. UDHR supra note 24, art. 23(1); ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 6.
37. UDHR, supra note 24, art. 23(3); ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 7(a)(i).
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the job in the same conditions for less could readily replace them. As a re-
sult, laborers accept jobs no matter how long the hours may be or how de-
grading the work or conditions are. So by opportunistically decreasing the 
cost of labor to satisfy the global demand for cheap goods and services, par-
ticularly from wealthier countries,
38
trafficking pigeon-holes laborers—
especially laborers with few other skills—into a situation of little-to-no eco-
nomic power, encouraging and exacerbating their poverty. Such wage de-
preciation allows the rich to maintain and grow their enormous wealth, at 
the cost of entrapping victims and their progeny in a cycle of poverty. Most 
will never earn nearly enough to have the buying power to leave these con-
ditions, and they consequently cannot escape trafficking. If one of the inter-
national community’s goals is to realize “the ideal of free human beings en-
joying freedom from fear and want,” the continued existence of trafficking 
will make this end unattainable.
39
Ultimately, trafficking thus cuts against initiatives advanced by the in-
ternational community to ensure such rights are universally respected by 
taking advantage of the global desire for cheap products, widely demanded 
by individuals and states worldwide. The global community is therefore par-
tially responsible, and can only make right if it also initiates a coordinated 
response. Indeed, it may be difficult for victims to independently discern 
those wages and relationships that are exploitative, due to the “push”
40
and 
“pull”
41
factors that drive individuals from countries lacking in economic 
opportunity into countries with higher levels of prosperity.
42
Traffickers use 
this push and pull dynamic as a recruitment tool by promising victims a bet-
ter life and increased opportunity.
43
And given their vulnerability, victims 
38. See Dana Raigrodski, Economic Migration Gone Wrong: Trafficking in Persons 
Through the Lens of Gender, Labor, and Globalization, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79, 
100 (2015).
39. ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 1(1).
40. Push factors for trafficking, i.e., the conditions lending to an individual’s vulnera-
bility in the first place, include: high unemployment and poverty, with little to no chance of 
leaving the situation; discriminatory labor markets; lack of opportunity to improve one’s qual-
ity of life; gender or ethnic discrimination; internal conflict and persecution, domestic vio-
lence or abuse; and the proliferation of human rights violations. See Luz Estella Nagle, Selling 
Souls: The Effect of Globalization on Human Trafficking and Forced Servitude, 26 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 131, 137–38 (2008).
41. Pull factors for trafficking, i.e., the conditions allowing perpetrators to capitalize on 
victims’ vulnerabilities, include: awareness of a demand for labor, no matter how cheap; the 
fundamental desire to achieve a better life; the relative frequency and efficiency of transporta-
tion structures to support trafficking; a high number of facilitators and consumers benefitting 
from this exploitation; the existence of weak or no laws against forced servitude; a lack of 
public awareness that trafficking is occurring; government corruption; weak law enforcement; 
and entrenched organized crime networks. Id. at 138–39. 
42. Jones et al., supra note 12, at 112. 
43. Id. at 113.
2020] Increasing Case Traffic at the ICC 549
are often not in a position to discern the gross exaggerations of traffickers. 
Trafficking victims need another institution to step in.
44
Such help could come from the government of the state in which they 
are trafficked, but where national-level initiatives fall short,
45
the interna-
tional community must provide a fallback. One such response could come 
from enforcement of the Trafficking Protocol, an anti-transnational orga-
nized crime treaty discussed in the next section. Another could come from 
ICC investigation and prosecution of state officials (or individuals with 
powers similar thereto) that have become entangled in, or perpetrated, traf-
ficking.
46
Note that neither the definition of trafficking in Part I nor the reasons 
trafficking merits global attention, discussed here, suggest that trafficking 
necessitates violence or a conflict-ridden atmosphere. Rather, these two 
parts have illustrated that trafficking cases can crop up in coercive situations 
in times of relative peace and have severe, long lasting effects, both for in-
dividuals and economies. This peacetime trafficking, like trafficking more 
broadly, calls for a response at the international level in addition to the na-
tional one. As put by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “If the rule 
of law is undermined not only in one country, but in many, then those who 
defend it cannot limit themselves to purely national means.”
47
III. The Trafficking Protocol and a Complementary Role 
for the Court
A. The Trafficking Protocol’s Scope
In an effort to provide an international response to transnational orga-
nized crime, in 2000 the General Assembly adopted the Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, along with three supplemental protocols on 
trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and illicit manufacturing and 
trafficking in firearms (known collectively as the “Palermo Protocols”).
48
The Convention’s Trafficking Protocol is the principal international instru-
ment addressing human trafficking and is an important starting point for un-
44. Id.
45. See infra notes 66–69.
46. See Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 4 (“The Court may exercise its functions and 
powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special agree-
ment, on the territory of any other State.”), art. 86 (“States Parties shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecu-
tion of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
47. U.N. Secretary-General, Address at the Opening of the Signing Conference for the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Dec. 12, 2000), 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/speech_2000-12-12_1.html. 
48. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 
2000, T.I.A.S. 13,127, 2225 U.N.T.S 209.
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derstanding how the crime is defined, the parallel accountability system it 
provides, and how the ICC could step in to provide victims with additional 
justice and deterrence.
49
The Trafficking Protocol is the culmination of a global effort to harmo-
nize the concept of trafficking in order to better combat the crime at the in-
ternational level.
50
The treaty has been ratified by 176 parties and is con-
ceived as providing a common definition of trafficking and its constitutive 
elements.
51
It has inspired national trafficking laws
52
and has even influ-
enced the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of its own con-
vention.
53
The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has also recognized the Proto-
col as instructive in interpreting article 7 of the Rome Statute.
54
The Trafficking Protocol’s definition of trafficking is particularly note-
worthy for its rejection of consent as a potential defense to a trafficking al-
legation and its treatment of coercion as an element of the crime. First, arti-
cle 3(b) states that consent is “irrelevant” to the definition.
55
This key 
feature bars traffickers from using victims’ consent—which may, in fact, 
have been coerced—as a defense to the crime.
56
Second, the Protocol recog-
nizes exploitation, rather than the victim’s non-consent, as the defining cri-
49. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4.
50. Zelalem Shiferaw Woldemichael, Criminalization and Prosecution of Human Traf-
ficking in Ethiopia, 4 BRICS L.J. 116 (2017).
51. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4.
52. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&clang=_en (last 
visited May 31, 2020).  See also Victim of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 
H.R. 3244, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000); Modern Slavery Act 2015, 63 Eliz. 2, c. 30 (Eng.); INT’L
LABOUR ORG., P029—Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (June 11, 
2014); Marley S. Weiss, Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: A Primer, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 1, 19 (2015) (“The ILO designed the Forced Labour Protocol to complement the 
UN Palermo Protocol [on trafficking].”); Council of Europe Convention on Action Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings, supra note 11; Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Traffick-
ing in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children, E.U-A.U., Nov. 22–23, 2006 (requir-
ing member states to abide by the Trafficking Protocol’s anti-trafficking provisions).
53. EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., Guide on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour, ¶¶ 53–54, (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_4_ENG.pdf (citing Rantsev v. Cyprus & 
Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25965/04, Jan. 7, 2010, ¶ 285).
54. See Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on Children 22 n.58 
(2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_OTP_ICC_Policy-on-Children_
Eng.pdf. 
55. Id. at 21.
56. Janie Chuang, The United States as Global  Sheriff: Using  Unilateral  Sanctions  
to  Combat  Human  Trafficking,  27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 445 (2006).
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terion of trafficking.
57
Thus, the definitional phrase “the threat or use of 
force” is not confined to violent acts. Instead, the force element may be 
“understood to refer to any situation in which the person involved has no 
real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.”
58
To-
gether, these features allow the Trafficking Protocol to cover a wide range 
of acts, from direct, physical threats against victims to the exploitation of a 
coercive living situation, consistent with the causes and consequences of 
trafficking identified in Part II.
Another important feature of the Trafficking Protocol is that it requires 
all States Parties to create or strengthen existing training for law enforce-
ment, immigration officers, and other relevant officials on investigating, 
prosecuting, and ultimately preventing trafficking.
59
Such measures are key 
to identifying victims (both directly and through improved evidence collec-
tion), which, in turn, will save more victims from their situations, lead to 
higher accountability of perpetrators, and help states to better understand 
whether particular anti-trafficking approaches are working or not.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”), the agen-
cy responsible for implementing the Protocol, issues an annual global report 
on trafficking that summarizes the domestic measures adopted and cases 
pursued by States Parties.
60
Notably, as the Protocol has been implemented 
by states over time, data collection of trafficking victims has improved.
61
According to UNODC, in 2009 only twenty-six countries had a government 
institution charged with systematically collecting and disseminating data on 
trafficking cases.
62
By 2018, this number had risen to sixty-five.
63
But while global investigation and prosecution of trafficking has im-
proved, prosecution statistics and an overall increase in trafficking victims 
indicate that much work can still be done to increase accountability for indi-
vidual traffickers.
64
While most countries have comprehensive trafficking 
legislation, many continue to have low numbers of convictions for traffick-
57. International Legal Framework—United Nations, LA STRADA INT’L, 
http://lastradainternational.org/human-trafficking/legal-framework/united-nations (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2020).
58. U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ELABORATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO, at 347, U.N. Sales No. 
E.06.V.5 (2006).
59. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, at 6.
60. See Trafficking in Persons, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/glotip.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
61. Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 14, at 15–16.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id.
64. See Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3.
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ing.
65
According to the UN Global Report on Trafficking, of the 136 coun-
tries that reported data between 2012 and 2014, only 29% had investigated 
more than fifty cases of trafficking in a year. Twenty-three percent had in-
vestigated between eleven and fifty cases per year; 11% had investigated ten 
or fewer cases per year;
66
and 37% had either investigated no cases or pro-
vided no information.
67
Moreover, while some regions have seen an increase 
in convictions,
68
others have not, despite continuing to identify victims.
69
There are a number of possible reasons for this gap in accountability. 
First, many countries have increasingly prioritized national security issues 
and consequently may have chosen to crack down on illegal migration and 
terrorism rather than trafficking per se.70 In effect, individuals who would 
have been identified as victims of trafficking in the past may instead be 
treated as illegal migrants.
71
Second, domestic trafficking laws are relatively new.
72
Authorities lack 
of familiarity with these laws may prompt them to charge trafficking cases 
under other statutes that they believe are more likely to end in a successful 
prosecution, such as grievous bodily harm, because the evidence necessary 
to sustain such convictions is easier to identify and gather.
73
But choice not 
to engage with the laws, however well-meaning, is cyclical, and it may also 
lead to authorities not recognizing, and therefore not pursing, conduct that 
the Protocol would classify as trafficking.
74
65. Id. at 23 (questioning whether the lower number of convictions reflects of investi-
gations and prosecutions of trafficking as a relatively low priority, low levels of trafficking 
activity in particular countries, or a limited ability for countries to detect this crime).
66. Amy Farrell & Brianne Kane, Criminal Justice System Responses to Human Traf-
ficking, in THE PALGRAVE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2019).
67. Id.
68. Camilo Carrranza, Human Trafficking Conviction Rates on the Rise in Latin Ameri-
ca, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/human-
trafficking-conviction-rates-increasing (noting a 31% increase in conviction rates in Hondu-
ras, a 23% increase in Ecuador, a 22% increase in Argentina, and a 21% increase in both Cos-
ta Rica and Guatemala. Bolivia, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela, however, registered 
conviction rates of less than 5% in 2017. In Argentina, conviction rates rose from 52% in 
2014 to 74% in 2017, but overall prosecutions dropped from 138 cases to just 51).
69. Rebecca Ratcliffe, Trafficking Convictions Fall 25% Despite Rising Number of Vic-
tims in Europe, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2019) (“A report by the UN found that 742 people in Eu-
rope were convicted for trafficking offences in 2016, the latest year for which there is availa-
ble data, compared with 988 in 2011. The number of identified victims increased from 4,248 
to 4,429 over the same period.”).
70. Id.
71. Id. 
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. For example, exploitative forced prison labor, as discussed infra Part V, may not be 
recognized as trafficking per se because society has traditionally conceived of it as a fair 
payment for one’s transgressions or wrongdoings.
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Third, some States Parties have chosen to target a narrower scope of 
conduct in their own domestic trafficking legislation (allowing, for example, 
victim consent to be a defense). This leads to far fewer cases investigated 
and prosecuted in those states than in states that have adopted definitions of 
trafficking that more closely align with the Trafficking Protocol’s.
75
B. Using the ICC to Expand Prosecution of Trafficking at the 
International Level
Under the Trafficking Protocol, a State Party that wishes to bring a traf-
ficking case against another State Party may invoke arbitration, and, if the 
states fail to agree on how to conduct the arbitration, seize the International 
Court of Justice to ensure compliance.
76
However, the Protocol does not 
create its own prosecution office or provide any means to initiate investiga-
tion and prosecution of individual perpetrators. Instead, it relies on states to 
take direct action on their own by conducting domestic prosecutions, with, 
as discussed above, varying degrees of success.
By contrast, the Rome Statute opens an avenue for investigation at the 
international level: Parties to the Statute, the OTP itself, and the UN Securi-
ty Council can each initiate proceedings before the ICC against suspected 
perpetrators.
77
If they begin to do so, the prosecutions would provide a more 
direct response to trafficking crimes, especially where states have been una-
ble or unwilling to prosecute domestically. Moreover, when it becomes 
clear that the Court will hear trafficking cases, States Parties will have a par-
ticular incentive to pursue these crimes, as non-compliance with their obli-
gations under the Rome Statute may subject their leaders to an investigation 
by the Court that the Trafficking Protocol cannot replicate.
The Court could serve a dual role in the trafficking space: establishing 
fact patterns for domestic law enforcement to watch in the future, and hold-
ing state officials accountable for permitting or creating the conditions for 
trafficking to occur. It could also help unify the laws on human trafficking 
across national jurisdictions, as parties to the Rome Statute are expected to 
bring their laws and law enforcement into compliance with Court jurispru-
dence.
78
This role would align with the Court’s existing efforts to strengthen 
domestic jurisdictions’ capacities to prosecute other crimes contained in the 
Rome Statute.
79
Simply, ICC litigation would not replace domestic prosecu-
tions; rather, in hearing trafficking cases, the Court would complement do-
mestic efforts by advising States Parties on the requirements of the Rome 
75. Michelle Madden Dempsey et al., Defining Sex Trafficking in International and 
Domestic Law: Mind the Gaps, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 137, 141 (2012). 
76. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 15.
77. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 17. 
78. Id. 
79. See generally Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Bureau 
on Complementarity, ICC-ASP/16/33 (Dec. 4, 2017).
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Statute and how to effectively investigate and prosecute the crimes included 
therein.
80
The idea that the ICC could prosecute trafficking is not a novel one: 
Previous scholarship has arrived at the same conclusion,
81
and the OTP 
agrees that it has the ability to prosecute these cases.
82
The idea that the ICC 
could complement the Trafficking Protocol framework is equally familiar.
83
Little has been discussed, however, beyond hypothetical fact patterns that fit 
within the Rome Statute’s framework on their face.
84
There has been mini-
mal engagement with how these cases would actually fare in practice in 
light of ICT jurisprudence, or with how prosecution of certain kinds of traf-
ficking in peacetime, rather than in the context of conflict, could fit within 
the ambit of the Rome Statute.
85
The rest of this note addresses that deficit.
IV. Peacetime Trafficking Could Be Prosecuted Under the 
Rome Statute
This part analyzes the Rome Statute’s treatment of trafficking from two 
angles. First, it assesses the language used to codify the crime, found in the 
Rome Statute’s article 7, and second, it applies those article 7 elements to 
situations in practice, in light of the Court’s case law. As will be shown, nei-
ther the Statute’s codification of trafficking as a crime with slavery-like el-
ements nor the threshold elements of article 7 prevent the Court from trying 
peacetime trafficking cases.
A. Trafficking Codified in the Rome Statute
While the Rome Statute does not expressly include trafficking as an ac-
tus reus of crimes against humanity (the crime described by article 7), the 
text of article 7 and its interpretation by the ICC and other tribunals clarify 
80. Id. at 25–26.
81. See, e.g., Julia Crawford, Could The ICC Address Human Trafficking as an Inter-
national Crime?, JUSTICEINFO.NET (June 17, 2019), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/
tribunals/icc/41684-could-icc-address-human-trafficking-international-crime.html (explaining 
that the OTP could demonstrate that a case of human trafficking fulfills the definition of en-
slavement or torture, and therefore could be pursued by the Court); John Cooper Green, A
Proposal Leading to an International Court to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings 25–26
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Library System); 
Kenny & Malik, supra note 7; Melanie O’Brien, Prosecuting Peacekeepers in the ICC for 
Human Trafficking, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 281 (2006).
82. See Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement to the U.N. Security 
Council on the Situation in Libya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970, ¶ 38 (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180509-otp-stat-UNSC-lib.
83. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RTS., Human Rights and Human Trafficking Fact 
Sheet No. 36, at 58 (2014), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS36_en.pdf.
84. Jane Kim, Prosecuting Human Trafficking as a Crime Against Humanity Under the 
Rome Statute, parts II, III (Feb. 2011) (on file with the Columbia University Law School).
85. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 84; Kenny & Malik, supra note 7.
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that human trafficking—both sex and labor trafficking—falls under the am-
bit of crimes against humanity.
Textually, the ICC’s jurisdiction over trafficking derives from two arti-
cle 7 provisions related to slavery. The first is article 7(1)(g), which encom-
passes trafficking of an exclusively sexual nature,
86 i.e., trafficking involv-
ing penetration or other exploitative use of the genitals. Article 7(1)(g) 
explicitly codifies “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of com-
parable gravity” as acts that, meeting the other threshold requirements of 
this article, would constitute crimes against humanity.
87
The Elements of 
Crimes—the document that assists the Court in interpreting article 788—
clarifies that sex trafficking falls within the scope of sexual slavery.
89
The other relevant provision is article 7(1)(c), which codifies “enslave-
ment” as a crime against humanity.
90
In article 7(2)(c), the Rome Statute 
goes on to define “enslavement” as the “exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person . . . includ[ing] the exercise 
of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, particularly women 
and children.”
91
Again, the Elements of Crimes establishes that enslavement 
includes trafficking in persons.
92
Thus, article 7(1)(c) should be understood 
to encompass all forms of trafficking lacking a sexual element, since sex 
trafficking is covered by 7(1)(g). Notably, neither provision appears to limit 
prosecutable trafficking to acts committed in the context of conflict or vio-
lence.
The way the Rome Statute addresses trafficking is controversial. The 
division of slavery (and, consequently, trafficking) into two separate actus 
reī was criticized by some state delegates when the Rome Statute was being 
negotiated. Those delegates advocated consolidating the two forms of the 
crime into a single one in order to reduce overlap in the Rome Statute’s 
coverage.
93
In particular, at the point that article 7(1)(c) categorizes traffick-
ing as slavery, it would seem that enslavement would encompass both labor 
trafficking and sexual trafficking, as sexual slavery seems to be but a specif-
ic form of slavery. Not only would this seem to be logical, these representa-
tives argued, but it would also avoid confusion and “ensure that the Statute 
only contained the most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
86. Int’l Criminal Court, ICC RC/11, Elements of Crimes 8 (2010) (requiring that 
“[t]he perpetrator caused [one or more persons] to engage in one or more acts of a sexual na-
ture” to meet the definition of sexual slavery) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
87. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(g) (emphasis added). 
88. Id. art. 9.
89. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 86, at 8 n.18.  
90. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(c) (emphasis added).
91. Id. art. 7(2)(c) (emphasis added).
92. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 86, at 6 n.11.  
93. Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advanc-
ing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 622–23 (2004). 
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munity as a whole.”
94
Otherwise, these representatives feared that expanding 
the list of prosecutable crimes would dilute their seriousness from the per-
spective of the international community.
95
Yet, the two forms of slavery are not the same act, and the violation of a 
victim’s sexuality adds a dimension of intimacy that cannot be glossed over. 
Consequently, other states emphasized that there could be instances where 
the ICC wishes to charge an accused individual of crimes against humanity 
in the form of both enslavement and sexual slavery.
96
One could envision 
situations where a defendant is accused of subjecting victims to different 
forms of slavery, namely sexual versus non-sexual, for example.
97
That said, the ICC has acknowledged the facial contradiction in separat-
ing sexual slavery from the broader category of enslavement, but has noted 
that “sexual violence violations were considered best to be grouped togeth-
er.”
98
This makes sense: Given the societal stigma that may be involved with 
sex crimes, victims of sexual slavery may need different or increased pro-
tective measures or redress.
99
The actus reus of “sexual slavery” was in-
tended specifically to protect sexual autonomy, whereas “enslavement” is an 
all-encompassing category for any crime that involves power attaching to 
the ownership of a person, regardless of the acts that the victims are re-
quired to perform.
100
By creating a separate actus reus for sexual slavery, the 
delegates ultimately embraced “the specific nature of the form of enslave-
ment and ensure[d] that it will be given the distinct attention it deserves.”
101
94. Id. at 623.
95. Id. Some delegates believed there was a tension between, on the one hand, the Stat-
ute creating accountability for the most serious crimes that one could commit (putting all the 
codified crimes on equal footing in terms of severity), and, on the other hand, the addition of 
more (and especially more nuanced) crimes, which could suggest differing degrees of severity 
between the crimes. Codifying “sexual slavery,” a particular form of slavery, suggests (at least 
symbolically) that there is something special or unique about this case that puts it on a differ-
ent footing than slavery or enslavement per se.
96. Id. at 624. 
97. For example, the Nazi state established bordellos catering to male inmates of con-
centration camps to provide them an incentive to work harder. Female inmates who were 
forced to work as prostitutes in these bordellos were forced to fulfill a quota of eight men per 
day. The Nazi government thus forced different subsets of inmates to perform fundamentally 
different kinds of work—some involving sex and some not. See NANDA HERBERMANN, THE 
BLESSED ABYSS: INMATE #6582 IN RAVENSBRÜCK CONCENTRATION CAMP FOR WOMEN 33–
34 (2000).
98. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 541 n.1333 (Trial 
Chamber, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (stating in full, “the set-
ting out of the violations in separate sub-paragraphs of the ICC Statute is not to be interpreted 
as meaning . . . that sexual slavery is not a form of enslavement. This separation is to be ex-
plained by the fact that the sexual violence violations were considered best to be grouped to-
gether”)
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Oosterveld, supra note 93, at 624.
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The drafters’ choice to categorize trafficking as “slavery” or as a crime 
involving slavery-like characteristics in the first place suggests that a traf-
ficking crime must exhibit the abuse of power attaching to the ownership of 
a person in order for the Court to analyze it.
102
But, as mentioned above, 
many instances of trafficking occur through exploitative or coercive practic-
es without actual ownership.
103
In the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, both en-
slavement and sexual slavery are described as requiring the act in question 
to involve any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, and 
both entries specify that these powers include “purchasing, selling, lending 
or bartering such a person or persons” or a similar deprivation of liberty.
104
This explanation seems to suggest that, in order to fall under the Rome Stat-
ute, trafficking must include some exchange of commerce or similar indicia 
constituting formal ownership of a person in a manner similar to chattel 
slavery.
But if the prosecution of enslavement or sexual slavery required a 
showing of ownership, the scope of prosecutable trafficking cases would be 
extremely narrow. Chattel slavery of this kind, such as was formerly prac-
ticed in the United States, rarely exists anymore, and would face global 
backlash.
105
This would also be a significant narrowing from the definition 
102. Kevin Bales and Peter Robbins claim that the Elements of Crimes codification of 
“enslavement” simply restates the 1926 Slavery Convention’s definition of slavery “with the 
addition of the practice of trafficking.” Kevin Bales & Peter T. Robbins, No One Shall Be 
Held in Slavery or Servitude, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 18, 26 (2001). Under this view, in effect, 
where trafficking can be established under the Statute, so too can the behavior required to es-
tablish enslavement. Id. In contrast, Barbara Bedont argues that the addition of trafficking al-
tered the Slavery Convention’s definition of enslavement, establishing “a new definition of 
enslavement which includes trafficking in persons.” Barbara Bedont, Gender-Specific Provi-
sions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 183, 199 (1999) (emphasis added). Jean Allain 
emphasizes that the Rome Statute codifies enslavement––not slavery––and thereby “does not 
add trafficking as an additional type of slavery [but rather] acknowledges that slavery is but 
one possible component part of the definition of trafficking.” JEAN ALLAIN, THE SLAVERY 
CONVENTIONS: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE 1926 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
CONVENTION AND THE 1956 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 231 (2008). In other words, Al-
lain takes the view that the article 7(2)(c) reference to trafficking does not modify the codified 
crime of enslavement; rather, the elements of enslavement may help contextualize but do not 
limit what trafficking cases may look like. Finally, Anne Gallagher, taking a self-pronounced 
“conservative” approach to interpreting article 7(1)(c) asserts the inverse, stating that traffick-
ing is a vehicle––akin to buying, selling, and lending––to the “exercise of a power attaching to 
the right of ownership of the kind required to constitute enslavement” and must satisfy the 
ownership requirement to be a crime against humanity. GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 216 
(2010) (emphasis in original).
103. See supra Part II; see also Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3(a).
104. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 86, at 6, 8.
105. The prohibition of slavery is generally agreed to be a jus cogens norm. See UDHR, 
supra note 24, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 8; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Internation-
al Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 68 (1997); 
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., Systematic Rape, Sex-
ual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict: Final Report Submitted by 
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of the Trafficking Protocol, which shows that ownership is not a necessary 
element of trafficking (though it may be a sufficient one); rather, exploita-
tion is key, regardless of the formal relationship between perpetrator and 
victim.
106
Consequently, scholars have debated exactly how trafficking fits 
within the Rome Statute’s definition of enslavement and what actually 
needs to be established to find that trafficking has occurred.
107
B. Judicial Interpretations of the Article 7 Slavery Provisions
While the ICC has not yet had the opportunity to clarify the relationship 
between trafficking and enslavement,
108
the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) expressed that enslavement encom-
passes a much wider range of conduct than the traditional conception of 
chattel slavery in Prosecutor v. Kunarac. In that case, the ICTY’s prosecu-
tor charged defendants Kunarac and Kovač with the enslavement and rape 
of Muslim women for the defendants’ sexual gratification. The Trial Cham-
ber adopted a definition for enslavement as a crime against humanity similar 
to that of slavery in the 1926 Slavery Convention and the Rome Statute.
109
Despite the narrowness of that definition, the ICTY nonetheless observed 
that “enslavement” may be broader than traditional definitions of slavery, 
the slave trade, servitude, or compulsory labor found in other areas of inter-
national law.
110
In other words, the Trial Chamber found “enslavement” re-
Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 
1998), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f44114.html.
106. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3(a).
107. See supra note 102.
108. In the only relevant case before the ICC, the OTP brought charges of enslavement 
in Prosecutor v. Ongwen. The Pre-Trial Chamber, however, did not elaborate on the elements 
or indicia of enslavement, likely because pre-trial proceedings function as probable cause 
hearings rather than full analyses on the merits. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-
02/04-01/15, Pre-Trial Judgment (Mar. 23, 2016). As the Chamber confirmed the charges—
including enslavement—against defendant Ongwen, the Trial Chamber will have the oppor-
tunity to further elaborate on the elements of enslavement if it so chooses. See ICC Press Re-
lease, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Confirms the Charges Against Dominic Ongwen and Com-
mits Him to Trial, ICC-CPI-20160323-PR1202 (Mar. 23, 2016). The Trial Chamber heard 
closing statements in March 2020, and is still in deliberation at the time of the publication of 
this piece. ICC Press Release, ICC Trial Chamber IX to Deliberate on the Ongwen Case, ICC-
CPI-20200312-PR1519 (Mar. 12, 2020). 
109. Compare Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery art. 1(1), Sept. 25, 
1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, Registered No. 1414 [hereinafter Slavery Convention] (defining slav-
ery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership are exercised”), with Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment, ¶ 539 (defin-
ing enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of owner-
ship over a person”), and Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(2)(c) (defining enslavement as 
“exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person . . . in-
clud[ing] the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, particularly wom-
en and children.”).
110. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment, ¶ 541.
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fers not just to slavery, but rather to a whole host of other conduct that may 
be exploitative or coercive in one way or another.
111
Critically, the Trial 
Chamber specifically included compulsory labor without remuneration and 
human trafficking among the conduct that could constitute enslavement.
112
To further contextualize the definition of enslavement, the Kunarac
Trial Chamber elaborated that indicia of this crime include, but are not lim-
ited to: (1) control of movement; (2) control of physical environment; (3) 
control of sexuality; (4) psychological control; (5) forced labor; (6) 
measures taken to prevent or deter escape; (7) force; (8) threat of force or 
coercion; (9) duration; (10) assertion of exclusivity; and (11) cruel treatment 
and abuse.
113
While these powers resemble ownership because they exhibit 
some level of the perpetrator’s control over another, formal ownership of 
the victim is not required.
114
Likewise, consent of the victim is irrelevant.
115
However, the Trial Chamber did not elaborate on how to weigh these fac-
tors comparatively, nor did it state that a hierarchy exists among them.
116
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s defini-
tion of enslavement, the indicia it highlighted, the absence of a complete 
ownership requirement, and the definition’s overall evolution away from the 
narrow concept of slavery embodied in the 1926 Slavery Convention.
117
Un-
der the ICTY’s reading, then, trafficking does not need to be the equivalent 
of chattel slavery to constitute enslavement as a crime against humanity. Ra-
ther, the prosecutor only needs to demonstrate that a trafficking aggressor 
wields power (i.e., any of the conduct described by the Trial Chamber) that 
would contribute to a relationship resembling ownership over the victim.
Only the ICC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) have 
codified sexual slavery as an offense separate from enslavement,
118
but those 
111. Id. ¶ 543. 
112. Id. ¶ 542 (“Further indications of enslavement include exploitation; the exaction of 
forced or compulsory labour or service, often without remuneration and often, though not 
necessarily, involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and human trafficking.”).
113. Id. ¶ 543.
114. Id.
115. Id. ¶ 542.
116. Id. ¶ 543.
117. In discussing contemporary forms of slavery, the Appellate Chamber explained that 
typical victims are 
not subject to the exercise of the more extreme rights of ownership associated with 
‘chattel slavery,’ but in all cases, as a result of the exercise of any or all of the pow-
ers attaching to the right of ownership, there is some destruction of the juridical
personality; the destruction is greater in the case of ‘chattel slavery’ but the differ-
ence is one of degree. 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 117.
118. See S.C. Res. 1315, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2 (Aug. 14, 
2000). The ad hoc tribunals, in contrast, only codify enslavement. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5 (May 25, 
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tribunals have both interpreted the actus reus of sexual slavery to share im-
portant features with that of enslavement. In Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., the 
SCSL emphasized that despite sexual slavery’s separate codification, it “is a 
particularized form of slavery or enslavement[,] and acts which could be 
classified as sexual slavery have been prosecuted as enslavement in the 
past.”
119
Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber concluded that sexual slavery “may be regarded as a particu-
lar form of enslavement,”
120
such that “what is encompassed with ‘sexual 
slavery’ must also be encompassed with ‘enslavement.’”
121
Therefore, to the 
extent that enslavement is understood, as it was in Kunerac, to encompass 
certain coercive acts even in the absence of ownership, so too can sexual 
slavery be understood.
It is worthwhile to note that this interpretation of enslavement aligns 
with the aim of a successful coalition of the ICC’s drafters, who wanted to 
create a provision that would attach to modern manifestations of slavery.
122
The drafters specifically rejected the proposal of some delegations—
including Costa Rica, Hungary, and Switzerland—to explicitly require 
“sexual slavery” to include the treatment of the victim or victims as chat-
tel.
123
Several delegations expressed that such a reference—whether in re-
gard to enslavement or sexual slavery—would be “outdated, inappropriate 
and imprecise” and would improperly confine slavery to the actual owner-
ship (as opposed to the more broad “powers of ownership”) of saleable 
property.
124
Others noted that as modern enslavement often differs from the 
1993). Notably, the Kunarac Trial Chamber included the performance of sex and prostitution 
as indications of enslavement generally, and by including them there suggested that acts of 
that kind could be prosecuted on the basis of exploitation and not only in the presence of chat-
tel slavery. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, ¶ 542.
119. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 155 (Mar. 2, 2009).
120. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges, ¶ 430 (Sept. 30, 2008). 
For the war crime of sexual slavery under article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 of the Elements of 
Crimes, the perpetrator must: “(i) exercise any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right or ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lend-
ing, or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar depri-
vation of liberty; and (ii) cause such person or persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature.
Id. ¶ 343 (emphasis added).
121. COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 42 n.48 
(Mark Klamberg ed., 2017).
122. See Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity and the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 75, 83 (Mauro Politi & Guiseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
123. Oosterveld, supra note 93, at 629–30.
124. Id. (citing Eve La Haye, Article 8(2)(v)(xxii)—Rape, Sexual Slavery, Enforced 
Prostitution, Forced Pregnancy, Enforced Sterilization, and Sexual Violence, in THE 
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classic concept of chattel slavery, the Rome Statute needed to have the ca-
pacity to capture a broader range of similar behavior,
125
or the crime would 
have no practical significance in the modern world, thwarting any intention 
for the Rome Statute to also target trafficking.
Last, it is also notable that this view fits cleanly with the Trafficking 
Protocol’s broad definition of trafficking. A harmonious interpretation of 
the Rome Statute with the Trafficking Protocol bolsters the complementing 
aspects of these two regimes: If the definitions of trafficking in these two 
treaties are in line with each other, it further legitimizes the ICC’s role as a 
court of last resort that investigates and prosecutes cases where officials or 
authorities of a state party have incited or encouraged trafficking in viola-
tion of their state’s obligations to the Trafficking Protocol.
Upon review of the definitions of enslavement and sexual slavery found 
in the Rome Statute and ICT case law, it is clear that article 7 encompasses 
trafficking. Moreover, it is likely that prosecutable trafficking offenses in-
clude a broad range of exploitative behaviors that can occur in both violent 
and peaceful contexts. Additional limitations on what constitutes article 7 
trafficking are discussed in the section that follows.
C. Human Trafficking and the Article 7 Elements
Not every commission of enslavement or sexual slavery will qualify as 
a crime against humanity that the ICC can adjudicate. Rather, to be prose-
cutable, either act must also meet article 7’s chapeau elements. The chapeau 
requires any article 7 actus reus to be committed by an individual associated 
with the state or other organization with state-like control “as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack.”
126
The chapeau is best understood as requir-
ing three elements: (1) that the perpetrator targeted a civilian population 
(e.g, through a particular policy); (2) that the perpetrator committed the act 
knowingly; and (3) that the attack of which the act was part had a wide-
spread or systematic nature.
Facially devoid of reference to violence or conflict,
127
the chapeau, like 
the more specific provisions of article 7 relating to trafficking, appears to 
capture crimes occurring either in times of war or peace.
128
In reviewing 
each of the chapeau’s three elements, this section demonstrates that the re-
quirements of article 7 do not bar the Court from reviewing peacetime traf-
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE, 3, 5, 191 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001).
125. Id.
126. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1).
127. See infra Part IV.C.1 for an explanation of why the word “attack” does not neces-
sarily implicate violence.
128. Christopher Hall & Kai Ambos, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, in THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 155 (Otto Triffterer & 
Kai Ambos eds., 2016).
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ficking cases. At the same time, this section flags possible challenges that 
past interpretation of the elements—particularly of the widespread or sys-
tematic requirement—may create for these cases.
1. The Policy Requirement: An Attack Directed Against a 
Civilian Population
To constitute a crime against humanity, the chapeau requires an “at-
tack,” composed of multiple commissions of the acts listed in article 7,  
rooted in a policy espoused by the state or a state-like entity. This is known 
as the “policy requirement,” and it essentially prevents one-off crimes or 
crime waves (i.e., multiple commissions of a crime that are not connected in 
an organized sense) from qualifying as crimes against humanity, even if the 
rest of the chapeau elements are satisfied.
129
This requirement—and more specifically the word “attack”—poses no 
barrier in itself to prosecuting trafficking cases of a peacetime nature. In an-
alyzing the policy requirement, ICTs have only dealt with attacks arising in 
conflict-type situations until now,
130
but the text of article 7 and prior ICT 
jurisprudence make clear that an “attack” is not confined to military cam-
paigns or other traditional notions.
131
In fact, article 7(2) defines “an attack 
directed against any civilian population” as “a course of conduct involving 
the multiple commission of acts referred to in [article 7(1)].”
132
And the 
ICTY Trial Chamber in Stakić emphasized that “an attack . . . is not limited 
to the use of armed force.”
133
The word “attack” in the Rome Statute thus 
departs from its common meaning and takes on the meaning of a strategy or 
plan that does not necessarily require conflict or violence.
134
Accordingly, as 
the ICTY and ICTR have repeatedly made clear in their jurisprudence, any
129. See Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised by Challenges 
at ICC, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 27, 2011), https://www.ejiltalk.org/essence-of-crimes-against-
humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc (“Crime waves of unconnected individuals or numerous 
spontaneous groups are ‘normal’ crime, not engaging in international jurisdiction. But where 
an organization collectively orchestrates or endorses harm against a civilian population, and 
the harm reaches the level of ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ violence, then it is no longer ‘nor-
mal’ crime but something more sinister, coordinated and dangerous, and warrants internation-
al concern.”).
130. Starr, supra note 15, at 1258.
131. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 623 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 581 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“An attack may also be non violent in nature, like imposing 
a system of apartheid . . . or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular man-
ner.”); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, ¶ 416 (“[An attack] may also encompass situations 
of mistreatment of persons taking no active part in hostilities, such as someone in detention.”); 
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128.
132. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(2)(a).
133. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Judgment, ¶ 623.
134. Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 165.
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mistreatment of a civilian population may constitute an attack, and it need 
not involve armed forces, hostilities, or any violence at all.
135
The conclusion that the chapeau does not require article 7 crimes 
against humanity to occur within a context of violence is further bolstered 
by the fact that article 7 also requires victims to be civilians: Individuals 
who are not participants of the armed forces or otherwise combatants.
136
By 
distinguishing civilians from soldiers—and requiring victims to be civil-
ians—the text reveals that it does not require that the act take place in the 
context of active conflict. On the contrary, if article 7 required the victims to 
be combatants, rather than civilians, then it would require a backdrop of 
violence.
137
In other words, while an armed struggle could be occurring in 
parallel to an article 7 “attack” against civilians, it is not a necessary cir-
cumstance.
There is, of course, more to this first prong of the chapeau—the policy 
requirement itself. Article 7(2) requires the attack be “directed” by a state or 
an organization—that is, it must be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy.”
138
As affirmed by both the ICC and the ad hoc tri-
bunals, to constitute the basis of a directed attack “[t]here is no requirement 
that [a] policy must be adopted formally as the policy of a state [or organi-
zation].”
139
Nor must the policy be stated expressly, clearly, or precisely.
140
Rather, it is sufficient to show the existence of an implicit or de facto policy 
that inspired the attack.
141
Additionally, article 7’s allowance that the policy 
can come from a state or an organization makes clear that non-state actors 
or private individuals exercising de facto power over a region can also be 
prosecuted for their policies.
142
135. See supra note 131.
136. E.g., Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgment, ¶ 965 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 30, 2013) (referencing the definition of “civilian” found 
in Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions). The presence of soldiers or other 
combatants within a targeted group does not deprive it of its civilian character, as a targeted 
population need only be predominantly, not completely, civilian in nature. Prosecutor v. 
Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 474 (Mar. 24, 2016).
137. It should be noted, as well, that many (though not all) of the crimes enumerated in 
article 7 have a war crimes equivalent under article 8. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 
17, art. 8.
138. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
139. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 396; Prosecutor 
v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of 
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 81
(Jun. 15, 2009); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ¶ 580; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-
94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 
1997).
140. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 204 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
141. Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 245.
142. Id. at 246–50. As Hall and Ambos explain, there is some controversy surrounding 
the question of which non-state entities may qualify to sponsor a policy. 
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2. Mens Rea Requirement: Knowledge of the Attack
Article 7 also requires that the perpetrator committed a qualifying attack 
with knowledge, i.e. with awareness that it fits within a broader campaign 
against the civilian population. This knowledge requirement adds to the 
Court’s general mens rea requirement in article 30.143 It serves to create a 
nexus between the perpetrator’s acts and the broader widespread or system-
atic attack,
144
and it excludes coincidental acts from qualifying as crimes 
against humanity.
145
Article 7 requires a perpetrator be “aware that a widespread or system-
atic attack on civilian population is taking place and that his action is part of 
[it.]”
146
It does not require, however, the perpetrator to know the details of 
the policy or intend for his acts to support the state or organization carrying 
out the attack.
147
He does not even need to know that his acts were inhumane 
or would constitute a crime against humanity.
148
The perpetrator’s motives 
for contributing to the crime are irrelevant.
149
It is not necessary for the per-
petrator to share the purpose or goal behind the attack or to intend to harm 
the same civilian population targeted by the broader attack in addition to his 
own victim.
150
As explained by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, “[i]t is the at-
tack, not the acts of the accused, which must be directed against the target 
population and the accused need only know that his acts are part thereof.”
151
Thus, the perpetrator “merely needs to understand the overall context in 
which his or her acts took place”
152
because it is this context that “increased 
the dangerousness of his conduct for the victims or turned this conduct into 
143. Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176. Article 30 (titled “Mental element”) reads:
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the ma-
terial elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that conse-
quence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary court of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circum-
stance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.
144. Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176.
145. Id.
146. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 221–22.
147. Id., ¶¶ 221–22; see also Hall & Ambos, supra note 128.
148. Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176.
149. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 103.
150. Id. 
151. Id.; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
152. Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176.
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a contribution to the crimes of others.”
153
This line of reasoning supposes a 
sort of risk assessment on the part of the perpetrator: Because he committed 
the offense despite knowledge of the greater attack, he took a risk that his 
acts would be part of the overall attack.
154
Note that the mens rea requirement restricts who may be indicted, but it 
does not restrict the kinds of conduct that may qualify for indictment. It 
does not exclude the possibility of prosecuting peacetime trafficking, as 
long as the perpetrator acted with knowledge that his act occurred in the 
context of an attack against civilians.
3. The Widespread or Systematic Requirement: 
Extensiveness of the Crime
The final element of the chapeau requires a perpetrator’s actions to be 
of a particular magnitude (or to occur in the context of other actions collec-
tively of that magnitude) in order to qualify as a crime against humanity. 
Yet even this element does not categorically bar peacetime trafficking cases.
Neither the Rome Statute nor the ICC’s accompanying Elements of 
Crimes elaborate on the meaning of the disjunctive “widespread or system-
atic attack” standard. In general, though, ICTs have interpreted “wide-
spread” to mean an attack of a “large scale” in terms of both its “nature” and 
the “number of victims,” and they have interpreted “systematic” as referring 
to “the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of 
their random occurrence.”
155
Patterns of crimes are therefore evidence of a 
systematic attack if they are not shown to be events accidentally repeated on 
a regular basis.
156
Critically, the widespread or systematic requirement attaches to an at-
tack as a whole and not to the individual acts that a particular perpetrator 
contributes to the attack.
157
The perpetrator does not have to personally 
commit a widespread or systematic series of acts in order to incur criminal 
responsibility; rather, his act or acts must only contribute to the overall con-
text in which a widespread or systematic attack exists.
158
Thus, an individual 
153. Id.
154. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 102. 
155. Id. ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 387 (Dec. 14, 
2011); Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 920 (Nov. 28, 
2007); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101.
156. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101 (“Patterns of crimes, in the sense of 
the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis, are a common 
expression of such systematic occurrence.”).
157. Hall & Ambos, supra note 128. 
158. As the Ambos and Triffterer commentary to the Rome Statute explains, 
If some murders, some rapes, and some beatings take place, each form of conduct 
need not be widespread or systematic, if together the acts satisfy either of these 
conditions. It follows that the individual’s actions themselves need not be wide-
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defendant can be liable for a wide range of acts that contribute to a crime 
against humanity—from directing the attack to providing assistance a single 
time.
159
As trafficking is often linked to a broader campaign against the ci-
vilian population and a broad range of other, sometimes inter-related crimes, 
such as forcible confinement, forced labor, and enslavement,
160
the Court’s 
ability to consider these acts holistically could enable a given instance of 
trafficking to satisfy the widespread or systematic requirement.
161
To determine if an attack was widespread or systematic, it must be as-
sessed under the totality of the circumstances.
162
Factors that ICTs have de-
veloped to clarify these two standards include: (1) the scale of the attack;
163
(2) the number of its victims;
164
(3) the nature of the acts underlying the at-
tack;
165
(4) the possible participation of officials or authorities in the at-
tack;
166
(5) any identifiable patterns of crimes in the attack;
167
and (6) the 
spread or systematic, providing that they form part of such a widespread or system-
atic attack. 
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128. For example, in Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber considered whether the alleged murder, deportation, and persecution could 
constitute crimes against humanity as a widespread or systematic attack. It answered affirma-
tively, pointing to a context of frequent, repeated acts of violence committed against the civil-
ian population:
[T]he evidence indicates that in the locations included in the charges presented by 
the Prosecutor, the amount of burning and destruction of properties, injuries and 
murders is among the highest in the whole Kenyan territory. . . . [T]he perpetrators 
erected roadblocks around such locations with a view toward intercepting PNU 
supporters and attempting to flee, with the aim of eventually killing them . . . [and] 
used petrol and other inflammable material to systematically burn down the proper-
ties belonging to PNU supporters.
Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., ICC-01/09/01/11, Pre-Trial Judgment, ¶ 177, 179 (Jan. 23, 
2012).
159. For more information on modes of liability at the ICC, see Rome Statute, supra 
note 17, art. 25.
160. Atak & Simeon, supra note 7.
161. Atak & Simeon, supra note 7; Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 167.
162. Id.
163. Id. ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101.
164. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, 
IT-95-14/2, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judg-
ment, ¶ 94.
165. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, 
Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101; Prosecutor v. Kuna-
rac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94.
166. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, , ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, 
Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101. 
167. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101 (citing Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Ap-
peal Judgment, ¶ 94). 
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improbability of the acts’ random occurrence.
168
No single factor or absence 
thereof is dispositive for either standard, so, for example, the numerosity of 
victims alone does not determine whether an attack was widespread or sys-
tematic.
169
Additionally, because the test is disjunctive, a group of factors 
may satisfy the test even if they only evince either the widespread or the 
systematic nature of the attack.
170
The effect of the totality test is that the scope of admissible cases under 
the widespread or systematic requirement is relatively broad—broad enough 
to cover peacetime trafficking. Indeed, no ICT has cited conflict or the in-
volvement of force as a factor in the totality test. And because the number 
of victims is neither the sole, nor the most important, factor to consider, traf-
ficking committed against relatively few victims could still be judged by the 
ICC if enough other factors are implicated.
171
For example, it may be possi-
ble to demonstrate the systematic nature of trafficking in some countries by 
showing the improbability of its random occurrence, as might occur where a 
trafficker follows a pattern based on a preconceived plan or policy.
172
In 
practice, then, the Court’s review of trafficking need not limited only to 
large-scale, exploitative enterprises that plague a substantial portion of the 
civilian population, or to cases where the government legitimizes a program, 
such as chattel slavery.
173
However, although the indicia for a widespread or systematic attack 
could facially include peacetime trafficking, caselaw on the widespread or 
systematic requirement suggests a trend among ICTs to find that an attack 
was widespread or systemic where it occurred in an atmosphere of vio-
lence.
174
Is this trend towards wartime or conflict-ridden cases a product of 
168. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal 
Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101.
169. Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia v. Herzegovina v. Stupar et al., Appellate Verdict, ¶ 
376 (Court of Bosnia and Hezegovina, Section for War Crimes Sept. 9, 2009) (“[T]he element 
of substantiality does not necessarily refer to the quantitative aspect[.]”). A similar approach is 
taken in determining whether an attack amounts to genocide. There is no quantitative mini-
mum for genocide; rather, a substantial part of the national, ethnic, or racial group must be 
targeted. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33, Judgment, ¶ 502 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (“[T]he definition of genocide] should be read as meaning the de-
struction of a numerically significant part of the population concerned.”)
170. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶ 215.
171. See Atak & Simeon, supra note 7, at 1036; see also Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal 
Judgment ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94. 
172. Atak & Simeon, supra note 7, at 1036.
173. See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. 
Kordić & Čerkez, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101; 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94.
174. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Judgment, ¶ 177, 179 (evaluating 
whether the alleged murder, deportation, and persecution were committed in the context of a 
widespread or systematic attack). Though the Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Ruto et al.
also considered the scale of the attack and the number of its victims, it primarily reviewed the 
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the widespread or systematic requirement itself, or have existing ICT cases 
only interpreted it in violent contexts? Because neither the Rome Statute nor 
ICT caselaw requires proof of violence as part of the “widespread or sys-
tematic” standard, it should not be an obstacle to prosecuting peacetime traf-
ficking in practice.
V.  Steps Toward Accountability: 
Trafficking Archetypes to Consider
There are three types of peacetime trafficking cases that the OTP should 
watch closely for the opportunity to bring before the ICC: (1) state agents 
trafficking civilians themselves; (2) state agents facilitating the trafficking 
of civilians, but not engaging in the trafficking themselves; and (3) state 
agents acquiescing to trafficking, particularly through generationally-
embedded forms of slavery. This part will show how each of these three 
cases satisfy the threshold elements of article 7—including the requirements 
of the chapeau.
175
Discussions for each case archetype will conclude with an 
overview of the pros and cons of prosecution in practice, with special em-
phasis on prosecution’s potential to contribute to increased accountability 
for trafficking.
176
frequent, repeated acts of violence committed by the accused against the civilian population, 
suggesting that the existence of a background of physical violence and destruction formed a 
key part of its evaluation. 
As another example, in Prosecutor v. Brima et al., the SCSL similarly emphasized the 
violent backdrop upon which an alleged abduction, forced labor, and forced marriage were 
committed to support its finding of a widespread or systematic attack. Prosecutor v. Brima, et 
al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment. Though it concluded that the forced labor and 
marriages did not constitute crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber emphasized that dur-
ing the alleged acts, a military coup had occurred and the military had coordinated “routine 
direct attacks against civilians suspected of supporting [political opposition], in the course of 
which civilians were shot and their property looted,” and entire villages were burned on the 
basis that they harbored political opponents. Id. at ¶¶ 224, 227. The Appeals Chamber then 
relied on “the atmosphere of violence” in which the forced labor and marriages occurred to 
support overturning the Trial Chamber’s finding that these acts did not constitute crimes 
against humanity. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 200 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone Feb. 22, 2008). Specifically, it noted that victims were repeat-
edly subjected to physical and sexual violence, forced to watch the killing or mutilation of 
close family members, and ostracized from their communities after perpetrators forced them 
to become their wives. Id. ¶¶ 199, 200.
And last, the ICTR Appeals Chamber ruled in 2006 that the Trial Chambers must take 
judicial notice that a widespread or systematic attack occurred against a civilian population 
defined by its Tutsi ethnicity. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, ¶ 32 (June 16, 2006).
This conclusion was based on multiple killings and commissions of serious bodily or mental 
harm against the Tutsi population, resulting in a large number of deaths. Id. ¶ 31.
175. The first two archetypes lend themselves more to charging as enslavement than as 
sexual slavery, but the third archetype could more readily be charged as either.
176. This section refers to state action, but the ICC could also hear cases involving non-
state organizations with effective control over the relevant territory.
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A. State-Imposed Trafficking: Forced Labor in Prisons
State-imposed forced labor is likely the most straightforward form of 
peacetime trafficking to prosecute as a crime against humanity. Defined 
broadly as the state taking advantage of an individual’s duty or obligation to 
the government,
177
state-imposed forced labor includes compulsory partici-
pation in public works projects, abused conscription, prison labor, and gov-
ernment-ordered work that exceeds normal civil obligations or contracted 
services.
178
This section uses the U.S. prison system as an example to 
demonstrate that some cases of state-imposed forced labor could satisfy the 
threshold elements of enslavement under article 7.
179
The Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains a general 
ban on slavery, but it makes an exception for labor or services performed as 
a condition of a prison sentence.
180
Indeed, the practice of prison labor is 
now ubiquitous, and the U.S. federal government advertises its prisoners as 
a cheap source of labor.
181
Through UNICOR (also known as Federal Prison 
177. See Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 41–42; Cazzie Reyes, 
State-Imposed Forced Labor: Why It Matters, END SLAVERY NOW (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.endslaverynow.org/blog/articles/state-imposed-forced-labor-why-it-matters.
178. Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 41; Ruben J. Garcia, U.S. 
Prisoners’ Strike Is a Reminder How Common Inmate Labor Is, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-prisoners-strike-is-reminder-how-commonplace-inmate-
labor-is.
179. The United States is only one illustrative example of how, in general, forced labor 
in prisons satisfy the article 7 requirements. As the United States is not a party to the Rome 
Statute and because the forced labor it permits occurs in its own territory, the ICC will not be 
able to commence an investigation into trafficking violations against U.S. personnel. I have 
selected the U.S. example nonetheless because there is relatively more information available 
on these crimes and because the logic still applies to States Parties engaging in similar prac-
tices. Other States Parties to the Rome Statute employing prison labor include Brazil, see Fa-
bio Teixeira, Volunteers or Slaves? Brazil Accused of Illegal Jail Labor, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 
2019, 7:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-slavery/volunteers-or-slaves-
brazil-accused-of-illegal-jail-labor-idUSKCN1RN0CN; Canada, see Justin Ling, Prison La-
bour, NATIONAL (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/in-
depth/2019/all-work-and-low-pay); Germany, see Jörg Luyken, Prisoners Launch Hunger 
Strike Over Forced Labour, LOCAL (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.thelocal.de/20151203/
prisoners-in-forced-labour-go-on-hunger-strike; Hungary, see Pablo Gorondi and Andras 
Nagy, Hungarian Inmates Working Around the Clock on Border Fence, AP (Sept. 21, 2016), 
https://apnews.com/e2e7543ae87145de95a98a2304fe8286/hungarian-inmates-working-
around-clock-border-fence; and Japan, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Japanese Prison, (Apr. 17, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=5&amp;v=yiw2NULDjKM.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
181. See generally UNICOR Services Business Group, A Winning Solution to Your 
Contact Center Outsourcing Needs, https://www.unicor.gov/publications/services/
CATMS361.pdf (strikingly claiming UNICOR is, “[t]he best kept secret in contact centers”—
a secret which is now “out”—and, “[a] winning solution to your contact center outsourcing 
needs” to promote using federal inmates to fill a company’s workforce needs”) (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2020). See also Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Federal Government Markets Pris-
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Industries), a government corporation established by executive order,
182
the 
U.S. federal government enters into contracts with agencies (such as the 
U.S. Department of Defense, to construct weapons)
183
and private compa-
nies.
184
Ostensibly, these contracts provide federal inmates with productive 
work, aiming to promote their rehabilitation into society upon release.
185
This arrangement, however, gives the federal government control over both 
the contractual arrangements with labor purchasers and the prisoners’ sen-
tencing conditions, enabling it to coerce inmates into performing contract 
demands or to accept less money in order to keep transaction costs low for 
UNICOR’s customers.
U.S. prisoners repeatedly complain of the government abusing their 
debt to society.
186
For instance, in 2018, inmates in seventeen U.S. states 
went on a several week strike to protest maltreatment and slavery-like con-
ditions in prisons, both state and federal.
187
The maltreatment included staff 
frequently threatening them—sometimes with violence—if they expressed 
an unwillingness to work in their prison jobs,
188
while the poor conditions 
included low wages—a few dimes for each hour of work, if anything at 
all—decrepit living facilities, and no guarantee of safe working condi-
tions.
189
In one federal lawsuit, inmates complained they were exposed to 
toxic dust and worked without safety equipment, protective gear, air filtra-
tion, or masks at a UNICOR computer and electronics recycling factory.
190
In contrast, regulations issued by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration require employers to provide personal protective equipment 
wherever employees’ work would expose them to hazards capable of caus-
ing injury or impairment to any part of the body.
191
on Labor to Businesses as the “Best-Kept Secret”, VOX (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/24/17768438/national-prison-strike-factory-labor.
182. UNICOR Services Business Group, supra note 181, at 1.
183. Sara Flounders, The Pentagon and Slave Labor in U.S. Prisons, GLOBAL 
RESEARCH (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pentagon-and-slave-labor-in-u-
s-prisons/25376. 
184. Fernández Campbell, supra note 181. 
185. Id.
186. Garcia, supra note 178. 
187. Fernández Campbell, supra note 181; Mitch Smith, Prison Strike Organizers Aim 
to Improve Conditions and Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/26/us/national-prison-strike-2018.html.
188. Flounders, supra note 183 (stating that, in the U.S. state of Georgia, inmates re-
fused to leave their cells at six prisons for more than a week to protest being forced to work 
seven days per week without pay, and that prisoners were beaten if they refused to work). 
189. Fernández Campbell, supra note 181; Smith, supra note 187; Flounders, supra note 
183. 
190. Flounders, supra note 183.
191. U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH STANDARDS STANDARD 1910.132(A) (2016).
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Such exploitative prison labor practices fall squarely within article 7 of 
the Rome Statute. The threat of a prolonged sentence or punishment for 
non-compliance, officials’ ability to control the prisoner’s movement and 
physical environment, and the compulsory labor itself are all factors exhibit-
ing an exercise of power similar to the right of ownership and bringing this 
offense under the ambit of enslavement.
192
This offense also meets all of the article 7 chapeau elements for a crime 
against humanity. Forced prison labor satisfies article 7’s requirement of an 
attack directed against a civilian population. It is an attack because it in-
volves forcing prisoners to repeatedly perform labor.
193
It is directed against 
civilians, namely persons serving sentences for violating domestic laws, ra-
ther than imprisoned enemy combatants. Finally, forced prison labor is an 
official state policy: Prison personnel are a part of a centralized staff hierar-
chy paid for or monitored by the government, and the government contracts 
with potential customers for the prisoners’ labor.
Whether the chapeau’s knowledge requirement is fulfilled depends on 
which actors the OTP charges. As this element requires perpetrators to 
commit their act or acts with knowledge of the broader campaign against the 
civilian population, OTP should target higher-level officials, those analo-
gous to UNICOR personnel with the power to enter into contracts on behalf 
of the government, or supervisory officials who have the authority to control 
inmates’ workflow, work conditions, and pay scale, or who oversee prisoner 
complaints. Charged officials should be those who knew or should have 
known about the existence of the repeated, exploitative interactions between 
the government and prisoners. Lower-level personnel, such as custodians or 
guards with little to no management power, would not have the requisite 
knowledge to incur criminal responsibility for trafficking. These personnel 
likely would not be aware of the frequent and systematic mistreatment oc-
curring across federal prisons, nor would they have any control over gov-
ernment contracts or prison labor policies.
194
Finally, forced prison labor can be shown to be widespread or systemat-
ic. Prison labor is a commonly used in the United States and other countries 
to discipline inmates, and there are frequent complaints of labor abuse in 
192. See supra, text accompanying note 113 for the relevant factors.
193. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(2)(a).
194. In cases where the accused cannot be proved to have caused trafficking, individual 
international criminal responsibility should not attach, lest the number of defendants be vast. 
See Starr, supra note 15, at 1280. OTP should also probably not charge lower-level individu-
als in an organization who have little to zero influence or policy-making power, and therefore 
no control over a criminal policy. In such cases, it is exceedingly difficult to prove that the 
accused possessed the requisite mental state––the default requirement in the ICC being 
knowledge––for direct commission of one of the codified crimes. See Rome Statute, supra 
note 17, art. 30. However, there exist instances where leaders of a state or organization know 
that trafficking is occurring and either participate in committing the crime or tacitly acquiesce 
to others engaging in it. These cases, which also involve opportunistic use of vulnerable indi-
viduals, may be able to come before the ICC. Id.
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both public and private U.S. prisons.
195
Thousands of inmates housed in fa-
cilities across the country participate in forced labor. It is therefore an attack 
of a sufficient scale to be widespread. State-forced prison labor is also part 
of an identifiable, non-random pattern of acts against inmates—namely, acts 
exploiting sentencing conditions for cheap labor—thereby making the attack 
systematic as well.
Nevertheless, while this analysis shows that state-imposed labor could 
be prosecuted as a crime against humanity, information-gathering problems 
may limit the OTP’s ability to bring these cases. Generally, neither the pub-
lic nor OTP investigators is able to witness prison conditions or interactions 
between inmates and staff,
196
and inmates are rarely able to relay their ac-
counts in real time to the public.
197
Grievance systems are not always avail-
able to prisoners, and even where they are, corrections departments have lit-
tle incentive to publicize (or respond to) prisoner complaints.
198
Consequent-
Consequently, information on the exact prevalence and form of state-
imposed forced labor is not always available, posing a challenge to potential 
investigations. Where information about prisoner complaints is not easily 
obtainable, the ICC may have to engage in more aggressive investigation 
practices to prove the widespread or systematic nature of the exploitation.
B. The State as a Trafficking Facilitator: 
The Ethiopian-Saudi Kafala System
A state does not have to traffic civilians itself to commit trafficking. 
Under the kafala (sponsorship) system in Saudi Arabia and other countries 
in the Middle East,
199
migrant workers must obtain a kafeel—a sponsor—to 
receive legal immigration status and work authorization.
200
State-created 
processes like these are often abused by workers’ sponsors. State officials 
managing these programs may be prosecuted with crimes against humanity
at the ICC if they facilitate and legitimize the sponsors’ exercise of powers 
attaching to the right of ownership and if that facilitation satisfies the 
threshold requirements of the chapeau.
Consider the kafala program pairing Ethiopian migrant workers with 
Saudi citizens as an example. To match Ethiopian migrant workers with the 
kafeel that they need secure a visa to legally reside and work in Saudi Ara-
195. Garcia, supra note 178; Fernández Campbell, supra note 181; Smith, supra note 
187; Flounders, supra note 183. 
196. Smith, supra note 187. 
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting a spokeswoman of the California Department of Corrections and Re-
habilitation who, in response to being shown a video of an inmate on a hunger strike, declined 
to identify the inmate or where the video was recorded).
199. Int’l Labour Org.: Migrant Forum in Asia, Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala 
(Sponsorship) System 1, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/132/PB2.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2020) [hereinafter ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System].
200. Id.
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bia,
201
the Saudi government engages with Saudi citizens interested in the 
program, while the Ethiopian government drafts employment contracts and 
kafala applications for Ethiopian workers and issues them to registered em-
ployment agencies.
202
These agencies recruit Ethiopian domestic workers 
who sign these contracts and apply for a kafeel.203 The contracts legally bind 
the workers to their prospective employers and make the legality of their 
presence in Saudi Arabia dependent on a continued relationship with their 
employers.
204
In practice, this means that workers must obtain explicit writ-
ten permission from their sponsors in order to enter the country in the first 
place, transfer employment, or leave the country before their contracts 
end.
205
Saudi employers typically require workers to surrender their pass-
ports and other travel documents, further ensnaring workers.
206
The Ethiopian and Saudi governments’ pairing of Ethiopian migrant 
workers with Saudi employers under the kafala program meets the criteria 
for enslavement under the Rome Statute.
207
It is not just that the contracts 
are abusive. Even protective contract terms contract are exceedingly diffi-
cult to enforce once workers travel overseas.
208
In some cases, the contracts 
201. See Tesfalem Erago, Ethiopians Fear Deportation From Saudi Arabia, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (June 30, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopians-fear-deportation-from-saudi-
arabia/a-39495113; Wesley  Dockery & Meriem Marghich, Saudi  Arabia: Critics Slam Hu-
man Trafficking of Moroccan ‘Maids For Sale’, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb.  28,  2018),  
https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-critics-slam-human-trafficking-of-moroccan-maids-for-
sale/a-42760030; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT:
COUNTRY NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA (2017), https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/
countries/2017/271271.htm [hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT: COUNTRY 
NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA] (“Due to Saudi Arabia’s requirement under its sponsorship, 
or kafala, system that foreign workers obtain permission from their employers for an exit visa 
to leave the country legally, some are forced to work for months or years beyond their con-
tract term because their employers will not grant them permission for the visa.”).
202. Ethiopian Women in the Middle East: It’s Contract Slavery, ADDIS STANDARD 
(Mar. 1, 2012), https://addisstandard.com/ethiopian-women-in-the-middle-east-its-contract-
slavery.
203. Id.; Fassil Demissie, Ethiopian Female Domestic Workers in the Middle East and 
Gulf States: An Introduction, 11 AFR. & BLACK DIASPORA: INT’L J. 1 (2018).
204. Id.
205. ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 1.
206. Demissie, supra note 203.
207. Cf. Zorana Knezevic, The Kafala Labor-Sponsorship System in the Gulf States,
HUMAN TRAFFICKING CENTER (Apr. 24, 2019), https://humantraffickingcenter.org/the-kafala-
labor-sponsorship-system-in-the-gulf-states. It may also be possible to bring charges under the 
sexual slavery provision where there is evidence that such contracts are being used to coerce 
victims into participating in acts of a sexual nature. In Saudi Arabia, however, where the state 
strictly controls and showing of sexuality, especially by women, it is unlikely that the kafala 
would sponsor sex work. See generally What Are Women Banned from Doing in Saudi Ara-
bia, THE WEEK (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.theweek.co.uk/60339/things-women-cant-do-in-
saudi-arabia.
208. Demissie, supra note 203; Nick Webster & Anna Zacharias, UAE Agreement with 
Ethiopia Will Further Protect Rights of Domestic Workers, NATIONAL (UAE) (Aug. 14, 
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to which workers agree in their home country are not the same as those they 
work under in the destination country,
209
and the kafeel has the power to re-
vise the employment contract terms after the contract has been accepted. 
This gives sponsors the opportunity to force migrant workers to accept low-
er wages, unfair working conditions, or poorer living situations than origi-
nally promised at a time when the workers can no longer leave the coun-
try—or seek a new job—without the sponsor’s permission.
210
This means 
that sponsors inclined to invest as little as possible for the services rendered 
could do so rather easily, and their employees will feel coerced into accept-
ing new terms.
211
Moreover, as Saudi Arabia lacks robust labor laws and the 
will to enforce reasonable kafeel terms, Ethiopian domestic workers often 
face overwork and abuse.
212
Examples of state-sponsored forced labor such as the Ethiopian-Saudi 
kafala program satisfy a number of the indicia of enslavement expressed in 
the Kunarac case.213 The taking of passports amounts to control of move-
ment and prevention of escape. Employers’ free reign to control victims’ 
environment, and their ability to coerce additional work under the threat of 
lower wages or non-renewal of the contract, or by using abuse or false accu-
sations of theft or immigration violations
214
all support a classification of the 
kafala program as enslavement under the Rome Statute.215
State-sponsored forced labor also meets all the chapeau elements of a 
crime against humanity under article 7. To start, the kafala program satisfies 
article 7’s requirement of an attack directed against a civilian population. It 
involves numerous acts of exploitation against thousands of migrant work-
ers, who are civilians looking to earn a livelihood and a crucial source of 
income outside of their home countries.
216
The attack is also committed pur-
2018), https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-agreement-with-ethiopia-will-further-protect-
rights-of-domestic-workers-1.759812; Knezevic, supra note 207 (explaining that migrant 
workers often have difficulties enforcing contracts due to a lack of fluency in Arabic, a lack of 
familiarity or understanding of the destination country’s laws, and authorities’ frequent dis-
missal of workers’ complaints when employer-sponsors, who are citizens, offer a differing 
account).
209. Knezevic, supra note 207.
210. ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 4; 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT: COUNTRY NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA, supra
note 201 (“Although many migrant workers sign contracts with their employers, some report 
work conditions substantially different from those described in the contract; other workers 
never see a work contract at all.”).
211. Cf. ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 4; 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT: COUNTRY NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA, supra
note 201.
212. Demissie, supra note 203.
213. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, ¶ 542.
214. ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 4.
215. See supra, text accompanying note 113 for the relevant factors.
216. ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 1; supra 
note 132.
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suant to a state policy, since sponsors’ abuses are all realized through the
state-sponsored visa-issuing system and contract placement processes.
217
Whether the kafala system satisfies the article 7 knowledge requirement 
again depends on which officials the OTP charges. Many officials in both 
destination and departure countries have knowledge that the kafala pro-
gram’s contracts and visas facilitate exploitative practices
218
because they 
have ignored complaints of those practices or are aware of colleagues who 
dismiss them.
219
Thus, ICC trafficking cases would be more viable against 
those who oversee immigration or law enforcement policies, or who are re-
sponsible for vetting potential employers. However, cases could also be 
brought against other personnel playing a key role in the kafala system’s 
functioning, like ministers of foreign affairs, because they likely are aware 
of the numerous abuses that have occurred—either from worker complaints 
or news reports—and have the power to reform the system. It would likely 
be difficult to show that individual sponsors or officials who commit abuse
migrant workers have sufficient knowledge of the broader abuses within the 
kafala system so as to incur criminal responsibility.
Finally, the abuses in state-sponsored migrant labor programs like the 
kafala system are both systematic and widespread. The Saudi and Ethiopian 
governments jointly created the visa-issuing system and thus participate in 
recruiting individuals for migrant work. Hundreds of thousands of domestic 
workers apply for a kafala, and thousands of victims complain of abuse of 
labor or living conditions resulting from their kafeel’s control over the con-
tract and visa.
220
These abuses are so consistent as to constitute an identifia-
ble pattern of crimes, all linked to the weak protections provided to these 
workers, and therefore extend beyond the random actions of individual 
sponsors.
However, because Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia recently entered into an 
agreement to bolster protection for kafala workers,221 the OTP should care-
fully weigh whether to bring a case against officials from either state. States 
should not be deterred from curbing their facilitation of trafficking or fault-
ed for making sincere but incomplete efforts to enhance protections from 
trafficking, even if they do not completely mitigate the problem. In such 
cases, a more fact-intensive investigation will be required to determine if 
states sincerely intend to meet their obligations under the Rome Statute to 
hold individuals responsible for trafficking accountable.
217. See supra note 142.
218. See ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 2
(“Sending countries and recruiters contribute to the Kafala system by providing the workers 
despite the well-documents reports of abuse and exploitation of migrant workers.”).
219. Id. at 4.
220. Demissie, supra note 203.
221. Webster & Zacharias, supra note 208; President Sheikh Khalifa Issues Labour Law 
to Support Service Workers, NATIONAL (UAE) (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/
uae/president-sheikh-khalifa-issues-labour-law-to-support-service-workers-1.661763.
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C. The State as an Acquiescent: Chattel Slavery in Mauritania
As discussed in the previous section, a state or organizational official 
does not always have to act to incur international criminal responsibility for 
trafficking. In fact, the state does not even have to be a direct facilitator of 
trafficking, as it is when it knowingly issues visas to migrant workers who 
are then exploited. A more ambitious—but still plausible—route for prose-
cution of trafficking is for the ICC to investigate and prosecute heads of 
state in countries with pervasive, generationally-embedded forms of slav-
ery.
222
Caste systems can legitimize both labor and sex trafficking and justify 
them on the basis of class. While a government may not affirmatively pro-
mote the trafficking that its society’s caste systems produce, there is room 
for the ICC to act where a government refuses to provide protections for 
victims or to implement laws to combat this crime. Some state actions or 
omissions, such as the Mauritanian government’s complicity in White 
Moors’ enslavement of the Haratine ethnic group, may be prosecuted as 
crimes against humanity where the actions or omissions aid and abet some 
individuals’ exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.
In Mauritania, people of the Haratine ethnic group—historically en-
slaved by White Moors—are born into slavery and owned by masters.
223
As 
a result of this practice, an estimated twenty percent of the Mauritanian 
population (about 600,000 people
224
) is forced into a lifetime of labor ex-
ploitation and torture.
225
Many slaves are physically brutalized,
226
and female 
222. Inaction in the face of the attack may be an actus reus for human trafficking where 
the accused was found to have a duty to act to protect a population. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. 
Ntagerura et al., ICTR-99-46-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 334–35 (July 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Galić, IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 663 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 30 
Nov. 2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1, 
Appeal Judgment, ¶ 188 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). Norma-
tively, such omissions are worthy of punishment to deter similar actions, since where a state 
refuses or fails to investigate or prosecute a crime against humanity, it accepts the crime and 
tacitly encourages similar, dangerous acts in the future. TERJE EINARSEN & JOSEPH RIKHOF,
A THEORY OF PUNISHABLE PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSAL CRIMES 359 (2018). This view has 
had little traction—likely because of issues in determining how far this duty should stretch. 
Nonetheless, it remains possible for an individual to be liable on the basis that he had respon-
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slaves are often raped by their masters and forced to bear their children, who 
are also slaves.
227
Even if a slave manages to escape, he is branded as part of 
the “slave-caste” and is ostracized from the rest of society.
228
Although Mauritania has criminalized slavery since 2007, the govern-
ment rarely enforces the law, and slavery remains rampant.
229
Since 2007, 
Mauritanian anti-slavery courts have convicted and sentenced only four 
slave masters.
230
This conviction rate is highly disproportionate to the num-
ber of complaints: In 2016 alone, anti-slavery courts received forty-seven 
cases for investigation involving fifty-three suspects.
231
Rather than prose-
cuting slave masters, the government has denied that slavery still exists in 
the country,
232
and it has imprisoned anti-slavery activists.
233
These individ-
ual complaints, group protests, and even international reporting have repeat-
edly notified government officials of the continuance of slavery, yet the 
government has chosen to turn a blind eye instead of taking action.
It is not surprising that Haratine slavery falls under the scope of en-
slavement—with Moorish owners tautologically having the power of own-
ership over those they’ve enslaved—and, where sex is involved, sexual 
slavery. Slaves must perform domestic work, including looking after live-
stock, preparing meals, or fetching water for no remuneration.
234
In cases of 
sexual slavery, victims—often women—are subjected to sexual abuse for 
the gratification of their masters and even for family members or friends of 
their masters.
235
  Moreover, slave owners control their victims’ physical en-
vironment, movement, and as explained above, often use force if the slave 
227. Sebastian Bouknight & Timothy Hucks, Slavery Hidden in Plain Sight in Maurita-
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does not comply.
236
In one account, a Haratine woman explained that two of 
her babies died because her masters forced her to work instead of taking 
care of her children.
237
The Mauritanian government’s complicity in the White Moors’ en-
slavement of the Haratine ethnic group meets all of the article 7 chapeau el-
ements of a crime against humanity under article 7. First, it satisfies the 
chapeau’s requirement of an attack directed against a civilian population. 
Haratine enslavement is an attack against civilians. It entails the commis-
sion of a vast number of offenses against civilian slave-caste members: 
Hundreds of thousands of Haratine individuals are exploited by members of 
the White Moor caste.
238
This attack is also committed pursuant to state pol-
icy, because the Mauritanian government’s choice not to enforce its own an-
ti-slavery law amounts to a tacit policy of acquiescence to and approval of 
continuing slavery. Focus should be on what the government has or has not 
done to protect the lower classes from enslavement.
239
Where the govern-
ment has done nothing to functionally end, or has in fact promoted, the caste 
system, evidence of a state policy to preserve the caste system is more obvi-
ous. Where the government has implemented laws against slavery or protec-
tions for the exploited instead, then a more fact-intensive inquiry into the 
extent to which the government has responded to victim complaints and 
whether continuing abuses are actually a result of one-off, unlinked instanc-
es may be necessary.
As for the knowledge requirement, it is inconceivable that individuals 
in the government—or any other individuals in Mauritania, for that mat-
ter—are not aware of the Mauritanian caste system, because it is an integral 
part of Mauritanian society and affects every citizen’s life. An ICC case 
against an acquiescent state like Mauritania would be most viable against 
higher-level officials responsible for enforcing laws outlawing slavery or 
punishing perpetrators of caste-system abuses. To make a case against these 
individuals, OTP would need to prove that they had knowledge not only of 
the caste system but also of the way the caste system creates a broad system 
of abuses against the slave caste, either through actual complaints re-
ceived
240
—whether formal or not—or from reports, protests, or personal 
witness.
241
Individual slave owners, in contrast, may not have the same level 
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of awareness of the way the caste system perpetuates broader harms against 
the slave caste.
Finally, the White Moors’ enslavement of the Haratine ethnic group is 
widespread and systematic. The caste system is of a sufficient scale and 
harms enough victims to qualify as a widespread attack, because it pervades 
everyday life with virtually complete communal participation. It also 
amounts to a systematic attack, because it methodically subjects particular 
groups to abusive treatment based on their birth. This pattern of crimes is 
identifiable and not random: The system repeatedly abuses those born into 
the lowest caste level and forces them to engage in labor or sexual acts 
against their will. And, arguably, because Mauritanian officials and authori-
ties—particularly those in policymaking capacities—participate in the crime 
by either denying its existence or refusing to respond to complaints of 
abuse, they contribute to the widespread nature of the crime by preserving 
and perpetuating the system throughout country.
Nonetheless, there may be some hurdles to charging a trafficking of-
fense on the basis of caste-base enslavement. One may be gathering evi-
dence. Victims’ complaints and reports would need to be recorded, perhaps 
with the help of local advocates or an organization dedicated to assisting
victims. Showing proof that an officer or other relevant official repeatedly 
or systematically declined to investigate allegations of slavery would re-
quire victims to come forward about their cases—a challenge, as victims 
may fear that reporting will lead to negative consequences in a society al-
ready prejudiced against them and highly dependent on their  continuing la-
bor.
Investigators must also determine when a government’s efforts are in 
good faith or reflect apathy. Where a government has implemented 
measures to combat caste-based trafficking abuses, but it does not actually 
enforce them, state policy permits the subjugation of lower social classes to 
abusive treatment against their will. The OTP could begin by only investi-
gating cases of multigenerational government acquiescence to trafficking, 
where there is demonstrated, long-term government inaction in the face of 
complaints. In any case, OTP must exercise prudence so as to neither 
wrongly accuse a government of apathy, nor to wrongly expend the Court’s 
limited resources.
VI.  Conclusion
Though the ICC has never issued a decision on trafficking, the Rome 
Statute contemplates the ICC’s jurisdiction over trafficking as an actus reus
of crimes against humanity. Upon examining how the Rome Statute codifies 
trafficking and how ICTs have understood similar provisions in the past, it 
is clear that there are no legal barriers to prosecuting trafficking, even in 
times of relative peace. Though the ICC’s OTP may face challenges in de-
termining how best to classify any given instance of trafficking—whether as 
enslavement or as sexual slavery—or in establishing that the trafficking in 
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question was sufficiently extensive to satisfy article 7’s “widespread or sys-
tematic attack” requirement, the Court has the potential to play a greater 
role in the international efforts to combat this crime, complementing state 
action under the Trafficking Protocol. In particular, the Court has the capac-
ity to try certain kinds of systemic, peacetime trafficking cases: Namely, 
when states engage in, facilitate, or acquiesce to trafficking.
This note has given only illustrative examples of these three kinds of 
prosecutable peacetime trafficking, leaving open the question of who exact-
ly to indict and how to deal with the evidentiary challenges that investigat-
ing these cases may present. While, ideally, the state or organizational of-
ficer whose responsibilities are most intertwined with trafficking should be 
held accountable for it, any indictment and investigation will likely face 
fierce opposition from the officer’s supporters in his home state or even in-
ternationally. The prosecution of peacetime trafficking will require discus-
sions about how to balance the countervailing considerations of ending im-
punity and preserving the legitimacy of the Court. While big questions of 
what will happen in practice remain open, only with trial and error—rather 
than inaction—can progress be made.
